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THE U.S. POSTURE ON GLOBAL ACCESS TO MEDICATION & 
THE CASE FOR CHANGE 
Michael Palmedo and Srividhya Ragavan* 
 
The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of including intellectual property 
rights within the larger agenda of trade. While the marriage between trade and 
intellectual property was always uncomfortable, COVID-19 exposed the 
flaws, failures and the inadequacy of the trade agenda to harmonise 
intellectual property rights, particularly for patents in pharmaceuticals. 
Typically, the United States through its questionable United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) process exposed the vulnerabilities of the intellectual 
property systems of the rest of the world. COVID-19 exposed the manner in 
which the so-called ‘superior’ intellectual property regime of the US left the 
country with a weak health-care system. Testing, cost of medical care, lack 
of treatment, lack of quick access to doctors are all barriers that generally 
place the United States as having one of the worst health care systems 
compared to other developed economies. The onset of COVID-19 merely 
exacerbated the existing flaws to expose these vulnerabilities.  
At a general level, other governments seemed to have been better prepared 
and certainly seem to have responded better. For example, in early 2020 
Canadian lawmakers passed a bill that would allow the issuance of 
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compulsory licenses for medical products.1 A compulsory license would 
allow the government to license the manufacturing of any treatment or 
medication or medical device that could help contain the spread of or treat 
COVID-19 to either a public agency or a generic drug maker. The license will 
allow the product to be available at a lesser cost because it will be free of the 
shackles of patent monopoly. The right to compulsorily license a patent to 
preserve public health was memorialised by the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) agreement on Intellectual Property known as the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),2 and later reiterated vide the 
Doha Declaration on Public Health.3  
Similarly, Germany has taken actions to ensure that patents are not a barrier 
to public health or to its health care policy.4 Meanwhile, developing countries 
like Costa Rica have reached out to the World Health Organization (WHO) 
to develop an IP pool to create an open licensing system that will create more 
access and affordability.5 Other countries have either already taken or are 
gearing up to take the same or similar measures to create access to treatments 




1 An Act respecting certain measures in response to COVID-19, Bill C-13, 43rd Parliament 
§31 (2020). 
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 14, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
3 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002). 
4 Act on the Protection of the Population in the Event of an Epidemic Situation of National 
Importance, Federal Law Gazette, Pt. 1-14, Mar. 27, 2020. 
5 WHO COVID-19 Technology Access Pool, World Health Organization (Jun. 1, 2021, 11:30 
am), https://www.who.int/initiatives/covid-19-technology-access-pool.  
6International community rallies to support open research and science to fight COVID-19, 
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Notably, these actions are legal under the relevant international law, that is, 
the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement.7 Just like the compulsory licensing flexibility 
mentioned earlier, the TRIPS Agreement permits a range of negotiated 
flexibilities during a public health crisis to prevent intellectual property from 
becoming a barrier to public health by way of respecting sovereign rights of 
a nation to prioritise public interests (including access to healthcare) over 
intellectual property rights. Specifically, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
allows governments to issue compulsory licenses, permitting generic 
companies to produce copies of patented products under certain conditions, 
usually including the payment of royalties to the patent holder.8 Other forms 
of flexibilities include price control of pharmaceuticals and importation of 
generic drugs manufactured from other countries. Many of these were used 
during the AIDS pandemic successfully by developing countries albeit with 
resistance from the United States.9 Currently, while countries are considering 
either flexibilities or, alternatively, cooperative R&D solutions, the U.S. 
FDA, on March 23, 2020, surprised the world by granting Gilead’s drug 
Remdesivir an Orphan Drug status for the treatment of COVID-19, on 
grounds this is a rare disease.10 The orphan drug status essentially allows the 
maker of a patented drug about 7 additional years of market exclusivity.11 The 
objective of the Orphan Drug Act, 1983, under which the status is granted, 
was to encourage research on treatments for diseases that impact a small 
 
 
7 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2. 
8 Id. 
9 Reed Beall and Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since 
the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, PLOS MEDICINE (Jan., 2012). See also, 
YUGANK GOYAL, COMPULSORY LICENSING: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD 
22 (Reto M. Hilty et. al., 2015). 
10 Designating an Orphan Product: Drugs and Biological Products, USFDA (Jun. 1, 2021, 
12 pm), https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-
conditions/designating-orphan-product-drugs-and-biological-products. 
11 Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA Chronicles (June 1, 2021, 12:30 pm), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/92548/download. 
 




number of patients – treatments with small markets.12 That big pharma has 
misused the orphan drug provision to extend the exclusivity for known and 
patent-expired drugs has been reported extensively. When Remdesivir was 
granted the orphan drug status, KEI reported that Gilead developed 
Remdesivir using at least $79 million in U.S. government funding after the 
Ebola crisis to deal with future potential pandemics.13 The backlash that 
resulted caused Gilead to announce that it will “waive all benefits associated” 
with the designation.14 That the United States is not actively working to 
provide access, and instead considers regulatory and patent related 
exclusivities is appalling. Gilead’s lack of public responsibility 
notwithstanding, the FDA’s actions seemed completely dissociated with the 
ground realities. On March 26, 2020, the US recorded the highest number of 
COVID-19 cases. To provide a background, orphan drugs are meant to treat 
what is termed as an orphan disease, which are defined as diseases that affect 
fewer than 200,000 patients, for which, typically there is minimal incentive 
to innovate a new drug given the smaller market size. Getting the orphan drug 
status helps a drug that is otherwise available in the market to become 
exclusive to treat the identified orphan disease/condition. The exclusivity that 
ensues from the orphan classification helps a drug to avoid market 
competition by getting the orphan status. Giving Remdesfavir orphan status 
to treat COVID-19 is ironic considering that during that month the US was 
recording close to 3,000 patients a day. Thus, the orphan drug status to 
 
 
12 Matthew Herder, What Is the Purpose of the Orphan Drug Act, PLOS MED (Jan., 2017). 
13 Kathryn Ardizzone, Role of the Federal Government in the Development of Remdesivir, 
KEI BRIEFING NOTE (2020), https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/KEI-Briefing-
Note-2020_1GS-5734-Remdesivir.pdf. 
14 Gilead Sciences Statement on Request to Rescind Remdesivir Orphan Drug Designation, 
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Remdesfavir showcases how the FDA completely altered the incentive 
structure meant for getting the orphan status.  
The FDA’s actions, comports with the global trade posture of the U.S. which 
can be faulted for not appreciating the importance of public health for the 
globe and for other countries. In the face of a mounting COVID-19 outbreak, 
with the possibility of a shortage of medical equipment and supplies, the U.S. 
Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, defended the trade posture with 
China which resulted in a shortage of medical supplies such as gloves and 
masks.  
More importantly, it is true that historically the United States has actively 
worked against access to medication around the globe.15 Be it with HIV, 
AIDS or SARS, when parts or all of the world has faced outbreaks of 
infectious diseases, the U.S. has ignored the multilateral systems and 
unilaterally used the powers of the Trade Act to oppose the fair use of 
negotiated flexibilities.16  
To provide a background, the Trade Act, 1974 under Section 301 unilaterally 
authorises the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to 
identify and pursue countries perceived as denying adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property (IP) rights or fair and equitable market 
access to U.S. industries or entities that rely on IP protection.17 Every year, 
USTR releases the Special 301 Report accusing various countries of having 
inadequate IP policies, and many of the alleged violations focus on 
 
 
15 Aswathy Asok, Compulsory Licensing For Public Health And USA’s Special 301 
Pressure: An Indian Experience, JOURN. OF IPR 24, 125-131 (Sep.-Nov. 2019). 
16 JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, COMPULSORY LICENSING: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE AND WAYS 
FORWARD 22 (Reto M. Hilty, et. al., 2015). 
17 19 U.S.C § 2242; §182 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
 




pharmaceutical patent protection.18 Once identified, USTR applies direct and 
indirect pressure through trade negotiations and preference systems in order 
to win policy changes favored by U.S. IP-owning stakeholders in the 
identified countries. USTR seeks IP policy changes by amending laws, 
providing regulatory exclusivities, or directing the way specific laws are 
implemented. These changes typically fall in line with the expectations of the 
USTR without fully appreciating local realities, and target the TRIPS-based 
flexibilities that provide for access to medications. Laws and amendments 
made in other countries to ensure access to medication form a huge part of 
the Special 301 Report, such that developing countries typically assert that 
USTR works to take away negotiated TRIPS flexibilities to provide access to 
medication.  The U.S. Special 301 Report routinely promotes levels of 
intellectual property protection that exceed what is required by the TRIPS 
Agreement, termed now as TRIP-Plus provisions. 
The COVID-19 crisis makes it imperative for all countries to fully use TRIPS 
flexibilities. Thus, while internally the U.S. will have to reconsider much of 
the currently prevailing health-care systems, not much has been said about 
how COVID-19 could affect the role of the USTR on the issue of 
pharmaceutical patenting and trade. In order to show the extent to which 
USTR has targeted the use of TRIPS flexibilities in the Special 301 Report, 
we reviewed countries that have used TRIPS flexibilities in the past to tackle 
different health crisis such as AIDS, SARS, Zika, etc.  In gist, we specifically 
examined reactions of the USTR when a country used TRIPS flexibilities by 
considering the subsequent placement of that country on the Special 301 Lists 
and the reason for the placement.  
 
 
18  Special 301, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Jun. 1, 2021, 12:05 pm), 
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301. 
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To do this, we used the most comprehensive source of data on the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities — the TRIPS Flexibilities Database — compiled by 
Medicines Law and Policy.19 It contains examples of use of compulsory 
licenses, patent exceptions, parallel imports, LDC transition provisions by 
countries and outlines the flexibility used in order to access generic 
medicines. The database is one of the more comprehensive set of data on use 
of flexibilities. The list does not claim to be exhaustive, but it contains many 
instances of use of these flexibilities and thus helps to make the correlation 
between the use of flexibilities and reaction of the USTR. There are a total of 
79 countries in the database. Some countries have used TRIPS flexibilities 
more than once, and the database includes each instance of a country’s use of 
flexibilities. 
In reviewing countries that have used TRIPS flexibilities and subsequent 
(re)actions of the USTR through Special 301 listings with a keen eye on the 
access to medication question, we found the following:   
First, we found that 93% of people living in countries that used flexibilities 
are from countries that were placed on a Special 301 List the year after their 
government issued a compulsory license. 
The countries that are included in the Special 301 Report are often large 
markets. China, India, Indonesia and Brazil are on the Special 301 Lists each 
year. Based on the most recent World Bank data, 4.5 billion people live in the 
non-African countries that used TRIPS flexibilities, and 4.2 billion them live 
 
 
19 The TRIPS Flexibility Database, Medicines Law & Policy (Jun. 1, 2021, 12:07 pm), 
http://tripsflexibilities.medicineslawandpolicy.org/. 
 




in countries that were listed in the Special 301 Report the year after they first 
used or planned to use a TRIPS flexibility – or 93%.20  
Second, the world’s total population is 7.5 billion people. Considering the 
population of the countries that have been placed on the Special 301 list for 
having included TRIPS flexibilities, a whopping 56% of the world’s 
population today live in countries that were placed on a Special 301 List the 
year after their government used (or planned to use) a TRIPS flexibility.  
Thus, directly or indirectly, the USTR’s actions has affected access to 
medication for over half of the world’s population outside of the United 
States.  
Third, 61% of the (non-African) countries that used TRIPS flexibilities were 
included on the Special 301 List of the immediately following year. 
Importantly, the report generally has not included Sub-Saharan African 
countries for reasons related to intellectual property and healthcare. A 
Presidential Executive Order, 13155, issued by the U.S. in 2000, which was 
a fall-out considering the AIDS crisis and its devastating effect on Africa, 
stated that "the United States shall not seek, through negotiation or otherwise, 
the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or policy" used by 
Sub-Saharan African countries to fight HIV/AIDS. The Executive Order was 
a by-product of negotiation by the African Union after AIDS ravaged the 
continent in early 2000s. 
Notably, out of the 79 countries in the TRIPS Flexibilities Database, 41 are 
located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Out of the remaining 38 (non-Sub-Saharan 
 
 
20 The most recent publicly available World Bank population data is from 2018. The World 
Bank databank does not include statistics on Taiwan, so here we use UN data for the same 
year, compiled by Worldometer. 
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African) countries, 23 were included on one of the Special 301 Lists the year 
following their use of a TRIPS flexibility. That amounts to 61%. That is, all 
of these 38 countries had considered seriously, or, issued or, begun the 
process of issuing (a) compulsory license(s) for a medicine. It is notable that 
USTR rarely uses the explicit term “compulsory license” when identifying 
countries as having inadequate intellectual property protection. USTR will 
often pair specific grievances with other, vague complaints about a list 
country’s intellectual property landscape. For instance, even in the 2019 
Special 301 Report, along with specific complaints about India USTR noted 
that IPR protection concerns remained about India due to inadequate laws and 
ineffective enforcement – which really could pertain to anything but was 
essentially a fall out from the one compulsory license India issued to cover 
Bayer’s Nexavar in 2012.  But, each of these notations of the USTR have 
historically prevented access to medication. Also, with countries like India, a 
one-time use of TRIPS flexibility has resulted in Special 301 mention for 
several years such that it becomes a deterrent for the country to use that or 
another flexibility again.  
The table below highlights countries that used TRIPS Flexibilities and 
Placement on Special 301 Lists. Importantly, the table highlights how 
unilateral PWL status, arguably in violation of the World Trade 
Organization’s multilateral dispute settlement process, ensues from the Office 
of the USTR, as a consequence of sovereign national action which was in 
comport with negotiated TRIPS flexibilities. Importantly, countries like India 
have been featured with PWL status, which needed to comply with the State 
of Administrative Action submitted to ensure compliance with the 
multilateral dispute settlement process as outlined in the opinion in Special 
 




301-310 of the Trade Act, 1974.21 Nevertheless, it is important for readers to 
know that one violation typically ensues in several years of featuring – most 
often, unfairly in the Special 301 report by the USTR such as with India.    














Argentina 2005 Yes Art 31 No 
          
44,494,502  
Belarus 2005 Yes Art 31 Yes 
            
9,485,386  
Brazil 2001 Yes Art 31 Yes 
        
209,469,333  
Canada 2007 Yes Art 31 bis No 
          
37,058,856  
Chile 2018 Yes Art 31 Pending 
          
18,729,160  
China 2005 Yes Art 31 Yes 
    
1,392,730,000  
Colombia 2014 Yes Art 31 Pending 
          
49,648,685  
Ecuador 2003 Yes Art 31 bis No 




21 United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, World Trade Organization, 
WT/DS152/14 (Feb. 28, 2000). 
22 Many of these countries were on the Priority Watch List before using the TRIPS flexibility 
for various reasons. For example, India was on the PWL for not amending the patent statute 
from 2005. In 2005, India amended its patent statute to conform to TRIPS but was again 
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Guatemala 2005 Yes Art 31 - 
          
17,247,807  
India 2008 Yes Art 31 No 
    
1,352,617,328  
Indonesia 2004 Yes Art 31  Yes 
        
267,663,435  
Italy 2005 Yes Art 31 Yes 
          
60,431,283  
Korea 2002 Yes Art 31  No 
          
51,635,256  
Malaysia 2003 Yes Art 31 Yes 
          
31,528,585  
Pakistan 2006 Yes Art 31 Yes 
        
212,215,030  
Peru 2013 Yes Art 31  Pending 
          
31,989,256  
Philippines 2005 Yes Art 31  Yes 
        
106,651,922  
Romania 2015 Yes Art 31 Pending 
          
19,473,936  
Russia 2018 Yes Art 31 Yes 




Taipei) 2005 Yes Art 31 Yes 
          
23,726,460  
Tajikistan 2005 Yes Art 31 Yes 
            
9,100,837  
Thailand 2006 Yes Art 31 Yes 
          
69,428,524  
Ukraine 2004 Yes Art 31 Yes 
          
44,622,516  
Albania 2004 No Par 7 Yes 
            
2,866,376  
Azerbaijan 2011 No Art 31  Yes 
            
9,942,334  
 




Cambodia 2005 No Par 7 Yes 
          
16,249,798  
Cuba 2004 No Art 31  Yes 
          
11,338,138  
Georgia 2006 No Art 31 Yes 
            
3,731,000  
Germany 2016 No Art 31 Yes 
          
82,927,922  
Guyana 2005 No Art 31 Yes 
                
779,004  
Haiti 2005 No Par 7  Yes 
          
11,123,176  
Honduras 2005 No Art 31 Yes 
            
9,587,522  
Mongolia 2007 No Art 31 Yes 
            
3,170,208  
Myanmar 2005 No Art 31 Yes 
          
53,708,395  
Nepal 2007 No Par 7 Yes 
          
28,087,871  
Norway 2018 No Art 31 No 
            
5,314,336  
Papua New 
Guinea 2007 No Art 31 Yes 
            
8,606,316  
United 
Kingdom 2015 No Art 31 Pending 
          
66,488,991  
 
Within the U.S., COVID has exposed the lacunas of a health care system that 
is inaccessible to many Americans. Even when accessible, the bureaucracy of 
a system that is completely privatised makes both access and affordability a 
rigorous exercise. COVID-19 will necessarily raise questions about the flaws 
of the healthcare system in the United States.  
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Along the same vein, COVID-19 raises important issues about innovation and 
access to health care globally. The world will be forced to consider whether 
the IP maximalist rhetoric of trade and innovation that has been used by 
USTR and the WTO to undermine public health, is, in turn, creating a worse 
barrier to public health. COVID-19 has also increased the significance of 
finding an integrated solution that includes the access question into the larger 
debate on trade and innovation. It has highlighted that a public health crisis 
in one part of the world can affect the globe, global trade, and all that the U.S. 
and the WTO stands for in unimaginable ways. COVID-19 has underscored 
the need for a balance between innovation and access.  
For the U.S., COVID-19 has undermined the carefully constructed rhetoric 
that stronger IP – stronger than what is required by WTO – is needed to drive 
innovation, and therefore trumps concerns over pricing and access to 
healthcare. As the U.S. struggles with the global pandemic, access to 
healthcare and affordability of medication seem to be the one paradigm that 
can alleviate much of the national and global concerns, including those that 
involve trade. Lack of medications either because of lack of research or, 
access, can catapult what could be a national public health issue into an 
international crisis or a pandemic 
While as a nation we consider different long-term solutions, the role of the 
USTR via-a-vis the use of public health flexibilities should be up for a serious 
debate nationally. Not just within the United States but at the level of the 
World Trade Organization too, which turned a blind eye to the unilateral 
pressure the U.S. imposes indirectly after agreeing to a system that requires 
multilateral dispute resolution. COVID-19 perhaps, is a call to reset the dial 
and look at trade with a dose of realism.  
